Abstract-This paper investigates the maximal secrecy rate over a wiretap channel subject to reliability and secrecy constraints at a given blocklength. New achievability and converse bounds are derived, which are shown to be tighter than existing bounds. The bounds also lead to the tightest second-order coding rate for discrete memoryless and Gaussian wiretap channels.
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proposed a one-shot converse bound for the problem of secret key agreement [11] , which exploits hypothesis testing. Building upon the technique in [11] , Hayashi et al. [12] established a converse bound for wiretap channels, which leads to the strong converse for the degraded case.
Contributions: In this paper, we propose new achievability and converse bounds on R * (n, , δ) for general wiretap channels. Our achievability bound is based on a new privacy amplification lemma, which is expressed in terms of the E γ metric [13] , and which refines the results in [6] , [14] and [15] . Our converse bound is motivated by [11] and [12] , and relates secrecy communication to binary hypothesis testing. The bounds are computed for a Gaussian wiretap channel. In this case, both our converse and achievability bounds are uniformly tighter than the best existing bounds (to the best of our knowledge).
By analyzing the behavior of our bounds in the regime of fixed and δ and n → ∞, we obtain upper and lower bounds on the second-order coding rate of DM-WTCs and Gaussian wiretap channels. Our achievable second-order rate is tighter than the ones in [7] and [10] , hence showing the advantage of privacy amplification in the finite-blocklength regime, among all constructions that are secrecy-capacity achieving.
We also derive two converse bounds for a specific class of codes, called partition codes, which are obtained by partitioning ordinary (nonsecret) codes for the channel from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver. Our bounds reveal an interesting connection between secure communication and list decoding at the eavesdropper.
Notation: The cardinality of a finite set A is denoted by |A|. For an input distribution P X and a random transformation P Y |X , we let P Y |X • P X denote the marginal distribution of P X P Y |X on Y . We shall consider the following metrics between two probability measures P and Q on a sigmaalgebra F of subsets of the set A:
• E γ metric [13] 
Furthermore, we define a randomized test between P and Q as a random transformation P T |X : A → {0, 1} where 0 indicates that the test chooses Q. We shall need the following performance metric for the test between P and Q:
where the minimum is over all tests P T |X satisfying
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND SECRECY CODES
We consider the wiretap channel model introduced by Wyner [1] , which is denoted by the tuple (X , P Y Z|X , Y × Z). A secrecy code for the wiretap channel is defined as follows.
• a message W which is equiprobable on the set M {1, . . . , M }, • a randomized encoder that generates a codeword X(m), m ∈ M according to a conditional probability distribution P X|W =m , and • a decoder g : Y → M that assigns an estimateŴ to each received signal Y ∈ Y. Furthermore, the encoder and decoder satisfy the average error probability constraint
where Y ∼ P Y |W P Y |X • P X|W , and the secrecy constraint
will be called an (n, M, , δ) secrecy code. Furthermore, the maximal secrecy rate is defined as
We shall also consider a class of codes which are constructed by partitioning good channel codes for the legitimate channel P Y |X .
Definition 2 (Partition codes
). An (M, , δ) partition code for the wiretap channel (X , P Y Z|X , Y × Z) is a tuple (C, π, P X|W ), where
• and P X|W is a stochastic encoder with P X|W =m , m ∈ M, supported on π −1 (m).
Furthermore, the encoder and decoder satisfy the secrecy constraint (8) and the average error probability constraint
where X ∼ P X|W • P W with W equiprobable over M, and
Note that the class of partition codes includes most of the existing coding schemes for wiretap channels, including the constructions based on polar codes [16] , LDPC codes [17] , and the ones based on hash functions and extractors [18] , [19] .
Definition 3 (Uniform-partition codes). An (M, , δ) partition code (C, π, P X|W ) is called a uniform-partition code if |π −1 (m)| does not depend on m and if P X|W =m is the uniform distribution on π −1 (m) for every m ∈ M.
The partition codes and uniform-partition codes introduced above are practically appealing, because they can reuse the decoder of the original channel code. Furthermore, the encoder of a uniform-partition code can be obtained by concatenating the encoder of the original channel code with a uniform random number generator.
III. MAIN RESULTS

A. Achievability Bound
The following lemma builds upon the leftover hash lemma [14, Lemma 5.4.3] and refines the result in [14, Cor. 5.6.1] (see also [15, Cor. 2] ). Due to space constraints, we have omitted the proofs of all results. They can be found in [20] . Lemma 1. Let C = {x 1 , . . . , x KM } be an arbitrary codebook of cardinality KM with K, M ∈ N. Let P X be the uniform distribution over C, and let P Z P Z|X • P X . There exists a function π : C → M such that π(X) is equiprobable over M, and that for every γ > 0 and every
and the expectation is taken with respect to (X, Z) ∼ P XZ . Lemma 1 implies that we can convert an arbitrary (nonsecret) channel code for the legitimate channel P Y |X into a secrecy code with bounded information leakage. This step is commonly referred to as privacy amplification (see, e.g., [22, p. 413] ). By combining the channel coding achievability bounds in [9] with Lemma 1, we obtain the following achievability bound for a wiretap channel.
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Theorem 2. Let P X be a probability distribution supported on A ⊂ X . For every K ∈ N, every γ > 0, and every Q Z , there exists an (M, , δ) uniform-partition code for the wiretap channel (X , P Y Z|X , Y × Z) that satisfies
and that
Here, ı(x; z) is defined in (12),
, and
B. Converse Bounds for General Secrecy Codes
We first present a general converse bound.
Theorem 3. Every (M, , δ) secrecy code satisfies
where W is equiprobable over M, and P Y and P Z are the marginal distributions of the Markov chains W → X → Y and W → X → Z, respectively.
The bound (17) is in general difficult to compute or analyze. Next, we prove a converse bound, which is motivated by the converse in [11] for secret key generation. This bound is both numerically and analytically tractable. 
where P XY Z denotes the distribution induced by the code.
Remark 2. Using the result in [11] , Hayashi, Tyagi, and Watanabe recently derived the following converse bound [12] :
Our bound is stronger than (19) since (τ + δ)/τ < 1/τ 2 .
As in the meta-converse bound [9, Th. 26] and in [11] , the main idea of the proof of Theorem 4 is to use the wiretap code as a suboptimal hypothesis test for discriminating P XY Z against P XZ Q Y |Z . The improvement of our bound over (19) comes from the construction of the test, which is tailored to the wiretap channel.
C. Converse Bounds for Partition Codes
In this section, we develop two converse bounds for partition codes. The first bound is based on the following converse result for privacy amplification.
Lemma 5. Consider an (M, , δ) partition code (C, π, P X|W ). Let P W XZ be the distribution defined by the Markov chain W → X → Z where W is equiprobable over M. Then, for every Q Z we have
where N |C| and P unif X is the uniform distribution over C.
As a corollary of Lemma 5, we obtain the following converse bound for channel resolvability.
Corollary 6. For every C = {x 1 , ..., x N }, every P Y |X , and every Q Y , we have
where P unif X denotes the uniform distribution over C, and
By combining (20) with the meta-converse bound on channel coding [9, Th. 26], we obtain the following converse bound for partition codes.
Theorem 7.
Consider an (M, , δ) partition code (C, π, P X|W ). Let P XY and P XZ be the distributions defined by the Markov chain W → X → (Y, Z) where W is equiprobable over M. Then,
where P unif X denotes the uniform distribution over C. Furthermore, if the code is a uniform-partition code, then
The next bound relates the secrecy δ of a partition code to the error probability of list decoding at the eavesdropper. To state our result, we first give some definitions. Consider an arbitrary partition code (C, π, P X|W ). Suppose that the eavesdropper attempts to perform list decoding for the transmitted codeword X. More specifically, upon reception of a signal Z, the eavesdropper outputs a list L(Z) ⊂ C of codewords. The performance of the eavesdropper's list decoding is measured by the maximum list size
and the error probability
Theorem 8. Consider an (M, , δ) partition code (C, π, P X|W ). Let P W Z be the distribution defined by
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the Markov chain W → X → Z where W is equiprobable over M. Then, for every Q Z , we have
where L and ld are defined in (24) and (25), respectively.
Remark 3. Connection between list decoding and secrecy has been used to prove strong converses for optimum query exponent and secret key capacity by Tyagi and Narayan [23] .
By Theorem 8, every achievability bound for the list decoding at the eavesdropper yields a converse bound on the secrecy rate of the wiretap channel. For example, using the threshold list decoder in [24] and following the analysis therein, one can obtain a slightly weakened version of (23), with β δ+τ (P XZ , P X P Z ) on the RHS replaced by β δ+2τ (P XZ , P X P Z ).
D. Asymptotic Analysis 1) DM-WTC:
We shall use the following notation:
and
The secrecy capacity of a general DM-WTC is given by [2] C S = max
where the maximization is over all probability distributions P V X for which V → X → Y Z form a Markov chain. For simplicity, we shall assume that there exists a unique probability distribution P * V X = P * V P * X|V that achieves the maximum in (31). Note that if the eavesdropper's channel P Z|X is less capable than the legitimate channel P Y |X , then the secrecy capacity reduces to (1) [25, Sec. 3.5.1].
The auxiliary random variable V makes the evaluation of (31) difficult. An upper bound on (31) is given by [12] 
For simplicity, we shall also assume that there exists a unique probability distributionP * X that attains the maximum in (32), and thatṼ (P * X , P Y Z|X ) > 0. Note that, the bound (32) is tight (i.e., C S = C u S ) if the wiretap channel is physically degraded [25, Def. 3.8] .
Theorem 9. For a DM-WTC P Y Z|X , we have
Here, Q −1 (·) is the inverse of the Gaussian Q-function Q(x)
2 /2 dt and
Remark 4. The result (33) is tighter than the achievable second-order coding rate in [7] obtained by using output statistics of random binning, and tighter than the one in [10] obtained via channel resolvability. The latter two approaches use a random coding argument and bound the average error probability and average information leakage averaged over all random codebooks separately. They then invoke Markov's inequality to show the existence of a code that satisfies simultaneously the reliability and secrecy constraint. The use of Markov's inequality introduces a penalty to the secondorder coding rate, which corresponds to the gap between (33) and [7, Eq. (23) ]. In contrast, our result shows that every code that satisfies the reliability constraint can be modified to satisfy the secrecy constraint, thereby avoiding the use of Markov's inequality. This demonstrates the advantage of the privacy amplification technique for wiretap channels in the finite blocklength regime.
2) Gaussian wiretap channel: Consider the Gaussian wiretap channel
where {U i } are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) N (0, N 1 ) random variables, and {Ũ i } are i.i.d. N (0, N 2 ) random variables. Without loss of generality, we assume that N 2 > N 1 (otherwise the secrecy capacity is zero). Furthermore, we assume that each codeword x n satisfies the power constraint
Theorem 10. For the Gaussian wiretap channel (38), we have
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E. Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we compare the bounds proposed in this paper with existing bounds in [12] and [15] , and with the approximations provided in Theorem 10 for a Gaussian wiretap channel (with the O(·) terms omitted). The results are shown in Fig. 1 . The bound labeled by "Hayashi et al." is [12, Th. 6 ] (see also (19) ), and the one labeled by "WatanabeHayashi" is obtained by combining the privacy amplification bound [15, Cor. 2] with Shannon's channel coding achievability bound [26] (which is the tightest achievability bound for Gaussian channels [9, Sec. III.J-4]). 2 Several observations are in order. First of all, both our achievability and converse bounds are uniformly better than the ones in [12] and [15] . Secondly, the expansions (40) and (41) provide reasonable approximations for the bounds in Theorems 2 and 4. Last but not least, there is a nontrivial gap between our achievability and converse bounds (which can also be inferred from the approximations (40) and (41)). Narrowing down this gap seems to require more sophisticated tools than the one used in this paper, and are left for future investigations. On a related note, it is also interesting to study whether the converse bounds in Theorems 7 and 8 for partition codes and uniform-partition codes lead to a tighter second-order coding rate characterization than the ones in (34) and (41).
